Canadian Military-Civilian Relationships within Kandahar Province

Adrienne Turnbull
Centre for Operational Research and Analysis
Defence R&D Canada, CORA
Halifax
CANADA
adrienne.turnbull@forces.gc.ca

Patrick Ulrich
Task Force Kandahar Governance Planner 2008-2009
Humanitarian Aid Worker
Ottawa
CANADA
pmulrich@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

An understanding of cultural differences and methods with which to mitigate them is important for resolving conflict in Afghanistan and other nations. A lack of understanding of different cultural groups can cause confusion and failed communication. Such misunderstandings do not occur solely between national or ethnic groups; they may also occur within organisational task forces or teams – among groups who are all working together toward the same goal (e.g., of defeating a counter-insurgency), yet who disagree on how specific progress should be achieved. This paper focuses on the authors' perceptions of cultural differences in relationships between Canadian military and civilian representatives within Kandahar Province based on personal experiences while working as technical and policy advisors within the J5 (Plans and Assessment) of Task Force Kandahar headquarters. The paper provides a description of these cultural differences, outlines specific examples of where these differences have resulted in successes or failures, and identifies current and potential solutions for addressing these differences.

1.0   INTRODUCTION

An understanding of cultural differences between groups and an attempt to mitigate them is important in resolving the major problems in Afghanistan and other conflicted nations. Cross-cultural competence is needed to work effectively in intercultural environments [1]. Misunderstandings do not occur solely between nations, as confusion and failed communication can occur within nations or indeed within organisations – such as among groups or elements within a team who are all working together toward the same goal, in this case of defeating a counter-insurgency, yet who cannot agree on how specific progress should be achieved.

For instance, up to the end of Canadian operations in Kandahar Province in 2011, there were many different Canadian government departments that were working for Task Force Kandahar (TFK) in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Afghanistan. The largest numbers of people were military who reported to the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND); the civilians reported to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Corrections Services Canada (CSC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and included experts from other government departments (OGDs). Each of these departments had a presence in Kandahar to support three lines of operation (LOO) – governance, development, and security. A fourth LOO is Rule of Law (policing and justice), although it is not referred to as consistently and was considered by DFAIT to be a part of the Governance LOO. DFAIT was the lead with the governance LOO, and was supported by the CSC, the RCMP, and others. CIDA was the lead with development, and DND was the lead with security. This paper will focus primarily on the lead agencies for each of these three LOO to avoid confusion, although the recommendations apply to all departments. The Canadian case, provided here in the context of ISAF, is put forth as one example to illustrate the cultural tensions that may arise within teams comprised of both civilian and military members from a single nation engaged in a broad range of NATO operations.

It should be noted that this paper will focus on the authors' perceptions of cultural differences in the relationships between the Canadian military and Canadian civilian representatives within Kandahar Province, based on personal experiences while working as technical and policy advisors within the J5 (Plans and Assessment) of Task Force Kandahar headquarters. The paper will provide a description, from the authors' perspective, of these cultural differences, outline specific examples of where these differences have resulted in successes or failures, and identify current and potential solutions for addressing these differences. It should also be noted that cultural differences may also impede collaboration between allied nations and within other nations, but these differences are not within the scope of this paper. In addition, there are many definitions of the concept of culture [2], but for the purpose of this paper, the authors will limit themselves to the specific tenets that culture includes verbal and non-verbal behaviour [3] and a collection of attitudes and practices within a system, organisation or among individuals [4].

To set the context for the present discussion, it will be useful to outline first the relevant organisational structures. In Kandahar Province, governance and development efforts were led by a civilian, the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK), and security efforts were led by a Canadian military general, the TFK Commander (TFK Comd). They responded to the requests of their departments, including DFAIT and CIDA for the RoCK, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) for TFK Comd, and the Canadian Privy Council Office (PCO) and NATO ISAF (Regional Command South) for both. A notional relationship chart is included in Figure 1. At the time of this writing, security was of a high concern, and both the civilian RoCK and the military TFK Comd were meant to work together as equals in bringing security, development, and governance to a population that is within a counter-insurgency environment. However, tensions related to differences in civilian and military culture prevented these objectives from being fully achieved. In the authors' view, the cultural tensions were likely related to a multitude of aspects, although this paper will focus specifically on how each department emphasised different skills, specifically with respect to leadership style and decision making; methods of planning; communication and differences in language; interpersonal skills; and work structure. There are potential solutions to these tensions, some of which are mentioned in the discussion.


Figure 5 - 1: Command relationships between TFK Comd and the RoCK at Task Force Kandahar

The staff members who worked for TFK were located in several compounds, each of which had representatives from a variety of departments with separate management lines. Many of the interactions between departments occurred as consultations when information was required by another department, for example, when the DFAIT political staff would respond to questions and requests for information from the military or the development staff from CIDA, and these and other departments would reciprocate when requested. There were specific situations, such as the Integrated Planning Team (described in more detail in Section 3.0) and the White Situational Awareness (White SA) Team, where individuals from multiple departments were tasked to work together to accomplish their team's goals. Participants in these teams were physically co-located, which in the authors' view fostered a positive environment for these teams as everyone was motivated to solve the team's problems collaboratively. In situations where information needed to be shared between those who were in different departments and in different physical locations, the authors' observed that communication was often comparatively more difficult, possibly because individuals were forced to use electronic systems, which do not include non-verbal cues, or because typing the response meant that they were less inclined to take the time to include less critical yet potentially still relevant details.

2.0 SKILLS

Government departments within a nation are willing to acknowledge that there are cultural differences between them, but they need to explore these differences, as well as the consequences that can occur as a result of these differences and how to mitigate problems, more carefully. Each government department values specific traits within its employees and this promotes different skill sets among different departments or groups.

For instance, the authors observed that DFAIT's core skills focus on political and policy analysis and recommendations to senior leadership, skills which promote a culture of written communication and risk management. DFAIT's risk management culture is reflected in the extensive internal consultations and formal approval process of routine, working-level communications. DND values decision making and planning, and emphasizes six criteria in the promotion of military personnel to higher ranks. The criteria outlined in each military member's annual Performance Evaluation Report are leadership, professional development, communication skills, planning and organisation skills, administration, and dedication. The authors' observations in Kandahar suggest that the most desired skills in a senior army leader, for instance, includes the ability to make reasonable decisions in a very short time frame and to communicate these decisions effectively within the chain of command. This is in contrast to the extensive consultations and formal approvals required within DFAIT.

These two descriptions speak to a difference in basic skills. Superficially, both DFAIT and DND emphasize leadership, communication, and administration. However, in the view of the authors, differences in the way in which these skills are fostered within the senior leadership of each department do result in the potential for conflict between each at a cultural and fundamental level. Although it is possible for two senior leaders – TFK Comd and the RoCK – to work well together, such a positive experience is not guaranteed or even necessarily likely, due to the cultural differences between the departments.

Effective leadership within the army is defined by decision making that is based on as much information as possible, but, as mentioned, ultimately decisions are made quickly. The time frame is critical, as although the strategic situation remains relatively static within Kandahar, the operational conditions can change often and the tactical conditions – specifically offensive operations by insurgents on local nationals (LNs) or Afghan national security forces (ANSF) – may require decisions to be made within minutes or hours. Diplomats may also be required to make quick decisions, but the authors observed that diplomats tended to spend most of their time accumulating information with which to make recommendations to others, which is ultimately a time-consuming process. With the exception of certain consular situations – such as the civilian evacuation from Lebanon in 2008 – diplomats seldom have to make decisions with immediate operational implications.

Further, the military decision making process is based on a commander's intent, whereas civilian decisions are generally made by the working level proposing courses of action to senior management, often in the absence of a clear articulation of senior management's intent.

3.0 PLANNING

A difference in skills is due in part to diverse types of deliverables that are expected of each department on a more global level. Each department contributes to the Canadian government's strategic plan for Afghanistan and Kandahar Province, but their strategic and tactical plans tend to diverge.

A simplified end-state in Afghanistan would be an independent country, where governance, development, and security are planned, executed, and managed solely by Afghans from a local through national scope. As the Canadian effort in Kandahar did not fully integrate the counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine as the overarching strategic approach to plan the advancement of the three LOO (the civilian departments were directed by the Canadian Government's Policy Priorities for Afghanistan), we will refer to this simplified end-state to describe the strategic effects sought by the integrated J5 planning team to bridge the COIN and Policy Priorities divergences in strategic effects. In order to effectively combine all this work the planning must be done collaboratively. However, this collaboration is not always accomplished easily.

From approximately August 2008 until March 2010 there was a collaborative effort to provide integration of all three LOO – development, governance, and security – in the initial stages of all TFK plans as this was considered likely to improve the success of each plan. A J5 Integrated Planning Team reported to the TFK Chief of Plans and worked toward the integration of the J35 Operational Planning Process (OPP – described below, see also [5, 6]). The team was originally comprised of three members, each representing their LOO:

Reconstruction and Development:	CIDA development officer
Governance:	Foreign Affairs officer
Security:	Major, OPP specialist
Policing:	RCMP officer. (included in 2009)

The members of the Integrated Planning Team worked for the TFK Comd and the RoCK, who in turn were required to balance the requests for information of both CEFCOM and ISAF. Military planning, including army planning, has been institutionalised within the Canadian Forces (CF) through the OPP. There are five specific steps involved in OPP (Figure 2):


Figure 5 - 2 Operational Planning Process

DFAIT and CIDA were not observed by the authors to have employed such a structured planning process. DFAIT played a mentorship and "nudging" role to encourage good governance with Afghan officials in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), a role that was based mostly on personal engagement and interactions with key leaders. CIDA's role was to facilitate development work through implementing partners and GIRoA line ministries, which required that CIDA manage grants and contribution programs. They focused on education, agriculture, and health as important areas for development as outlined by COIN theory, as these indirectly increase basic services. CIDA's traditional role in fostering development through partners or through contributions to international organisations means that the Agency rarely has a direct role in delivering on tactical results (e.g., by building schools and distributing seeds) and was not

familiar with contributing to the operational and tactical plans as understood by the military. CIDA's traditional approach was further complicated by the absence in Kandahar Province of CIDA's usual implementing partners (such as Canadian development non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) and the constraints of the Canadian government's grant and contributions policies to disburse funds to local organisations.

To be fair, the authors' view is that a similar disconnect was experienced with the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) teams that were deployed by the military. The role of the CIMIC teams was to engage Kandaharis (GIRoA, ANSF, and LNs) to coordinate and synchronise activities with non-governmental organisations, and to facilitate stabilization (security, governance, and development) efforts on behalf of or in conjunction with the OGDs in support of the TFK Comd's mission. CIMIC teams often facilitated work such as road and culvert reconstruction and the building of wells. The location for this work was often determined by the security situation, the political dynamics in the region, and the (perceived) needs of the locals. There was little to no consideration given to how each project contributed to the overall effects of TFK's campaign plan or how CIMIC projects interacted with the projects from CIDA, DFAIT and their implementing partners. During the time the authors were in Kandahar, the CIMIC team at the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was one of the least integrated components of the mission, as it neither reinforced the CF's campaign plan nor the civilian departments' focus on the Policy Priorities. This was due for the most part to the fact that the effort to integrate the civilian and military planning elements of the Canadian government in Kandahar was concentrated at the operational level in TFK headquarters, whereas the CIMIC detachment was a tactical asset of the PRT Commander.

There is a significant amount of overlap between governance, development, and security planning and execution, all of which requires a strong relationship between the RoCK and TFK Comd. The military commander often participates in Key Leader Engagements with senior governance people, such as district leaders. Governance is directly linked to security, as having influence with the right government people can have a strong impact on security. Often the Afghan officials, such as district leaders and Afghan security force commanders, are not limited to one of the LOO and thus their mentors should have the ability to work with them on all subjects. Ideally, an integrated planning team will better integrate the LOO and bridge the gap between the tactical plans and strategic objectives.

The work of the J5 Integrated Planning Team included the design of COIN provincial and district plans and the development of plans to meet specific goals. The team's work on integrating Government of Canada Policy Priorities for Afghanistan into TFK plans was at times possible on issues such as wheat seeds distribution or on TFK support to the polio eradication campaign conducted by the United Nations (UN) in Kandahar. However, it was not always possible to reconcile the demands of supporting Canada's Policy Priorities with the development of COIN operational and tactical plans in support of NATO campaign plans. All three LOO were represented, either as supported or supporting lines, as part of a multidisciplinary team process. The opportunity to combine the knowledge and experience of these team members had additional benefits as they were able to brainstorm and problem-solve in a way that took advantage of their differing backgrounds. In the authors' view, the team's results were more effective than would have been possible with three people working separately and narrowly representing their own government departments.

There were several challenges to a successful implementation of the J5 planning team, however. For each plan that was developed, the team needed to effectively integrate the strategic policy of DFAIT, CIDA, and DND. For example, mentoring of government officials is substantially different from planning a military battle and often required the strategic policy support of Canada's Kabul embassy in their interactions with the Afghan central government officials and other international actors. In addition to planning for both civilians and the military, much effort had to be given to integrating NATO ISAF and CEFCOM requests. They would often make requests on similar topics, and as a result a TFK-specific plan would be developed where the content would be unique to TFK, and each CEFCOM and ISAF request would be mapped to the relevant portion of the TFK plan. For example, both CEFCOM and ISAF would submit a list of assessment

criteria, and the J5 cell would then develop a list of realistic and relevant measures in order to ensure that all the requested assessment criteria (relevant to development, governance, and security) were addressed, the result of which provided both headquarters – CEFCOM and ISAF – with the measures and how they correlated to their original requests.

The authors' experience is that a common planning approach was critical to ensuring a constructive collaborative environment. The OPP was used in this role since within the army it was a well-known and reliable tool, although modifications and additions were made as required to address the needs of the OGDs. As is the case for any army officer of that rank, the military member of the J5 planning team had expertise in OPP, an expertise which is developed through months of coursework and years of application. However, many civilians are not familiar with OPP, and it was only in 2010 that a civilian-focused 3-day "Introduction to OPP" course was developed. Therefore, at the start of the collaboration, some time was needed for the civilian members to gain familiarity with the OPP and for all the planners to become comfortable with other members' individual styles. A common vocabulary was also developed, as is outlined in more detail in Section 4.0.

When the authors were in Kandahar, the J5 Integrated Planning Team was an effective construct wherein governance and development were primary LOO, supported by security. However, it is also the authors' view that civilian members of the Integrated Planning Team would have benefited from the opportunity to join the Task Force's pre-deployment from the outset to build an integrated planning approach and language prior to joining the headquarters in theatre. This requirement to integrate civilian staff officers remains a challenge, and the integration of strategic policies needs to be improved. Overall, however, the planning team worked well together, and such an approach would be recommended for similar future integrated deployments.

4.0 COMMUNICATION

One of the fundamental points of confusion among partners within a comprehensive approach, even partners from the same nation, is the communication that is used by each department. This extends from their vocabulary to larger-scale concepts.

The differences in vocabulary extend to both acronyms and specific terms. Over time many acronyms have come into common use – for example GIRoA, LNs, and ANSF – yet many remain unique to each department and these differences in the usage of acronyms may result in confusion. Similarly, terms such as lines of operation, SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD and BUILD, and commander's intent, were unique to the military planning process. Some words have more meaningful connotations, where the definition is agreed upon by all or is relatively apparent to all, yet certain departments have negative views of those words, as explained below.

There are varying effects that result from these language differences. In the authors' view, acronyms and key descriptors should be uniformly defined within joint or shared documents in order to alleviate confusion. Furthermore, a standard lexicon ought to be established and enforced. For instance, this was done with the development of the Kandahar Action Plan in 2008, as the terms that were unique to each department were discussed among the representatives of each department, and a vocabulary that was comprehensible to all was agreed upon. Words such as "operation" have a specific connotation; in a security environment the word may suggest kinetic military actions. In a COIN environment where there is a greater emphasis on governance and development there may be less desire to refer to the more kinetic aspect of security. In June of 2010 it was reported in the Afghan news that an operation was to take place in Kandahar City, which resulted in some LNs choosing to leave their homes temporarily. It was later clarified that the plan for this operation was to increase the number of ANSF patrolling the city, a situation that was aimed to be non-kinetic (i.e., no troops in contact with insurgents) and to produce an improvement in security. Due to the negative perception of the word "operation" by both the governance and development personnel, and the local Kandaharis, that specific word was avoided in all future descriptions of the plan.

5.0   INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

In a highly complex environment such as Afghanistan, where security, governance, and development goals intersect, there are many situations where the interpersonal interactions and much of the work is defined by individual personalities. In an environment where turnover is virtually guaranteed to happen within the year, and often on shorter timelines, this change is of significant concern, given the potential effect on interpersonal and working relationships. This is further complicated by differences in rotational cycles between the military and civilian departments (see Section 7.0).

Based on the authors' experience in Kandahar and the associated pre-deployment training, it appears that many people have preconceived ideas of other departments and groups that are based on incorrect or incomplete information. For instance, at the conclusion of the pre-deployment training experienced by the authors, some participants commented that the course was their first opportunity to work with the other departments, and that this interactive and collaborative environment had far exceeded their expectations and had created positive impressions and interactions.

Positive interactions can also be facilitated through secondments between departments, either before or during deployments. As observed by the authors during their time in Kandahar, these lengthier collaborations created connections and knowledge that allowed for positive and healthy working relationships between all departments. The depth of understanding often extended beyond the individuals to their superiors, colleagues, and subordinates. Such an environment does retain the potential for confrontations and problems, but this is not unusual when such disparate groups are initially learning to work together. Many of the secondments resulted in unprecedented levels of collaboration between individuals and their teams. Indeed, the importance of such connections was confirmed when they no longer existed in the replacements, as those who filled the same roles were successful but their ability to work with others was often limited, and this occasionally affected their superiors, colleagues, and subordinates as well. When the working relationship between many people is affected by the perceptions and personalities of very few individuals, then the authors propose that it would be prudent to encourage secondments, as well as implement standard operating procedures or institutionalised direction on how to interact together, in order to ensure that individual personalities and interactions are not the driving factor for interdepartmental cooperation.

6.0   WORK CONDITIONS

The differences in training, type of work, and organisational structure between the civilian and military partners also manifested themselves in different and sometimes conflicting cultures. The military has a regimented structure where the chain of command is absolute and detailed and in which there are many levels, each having specific expectations [7]. In the authors' experience the military personnel perceived civilians from all departments as having a less regimented organisational structure that is often viewed as being notional and in which a person's ability to lead is more dependent upon their knowledge and experience than their seniority. It may be that civilians can be as rank-conscious as their military counterparts (reflected, for instance, in the Canadian public service's position levels, such as the executive category – EX) but without the outward or formal signs of rank on a uniform. The military method of decision making is described as C2 – "command and control" [8] – whereas the civilian equivalent is expressed by the authors as "collaborate and cooperate," with more diffuse decision making by senior officials, often back in Ottawa in the home departments of the civilians. These differences may result in a more positive collaboration when the strongest points of each method are used, but often they were observed to be divisive and created confusion between individuals, at least initially. Opportunities to train and work together prior to the deployment tended to be key, as a more controlled learning environment, less stressful situations, and greater time allowances were shown to be more likely to overcome any initial problems.

The military system relies on a clear arrangement of ranks, appointments and trades that allows soldiers to gain, within a few seconds of looking at another soldier's uniform, sufficient information to deduce command and task relationships. Similarly, a soldier's rank usually refers to a predictable bracket of years of service, courses followed and assignments successfully completed. Civilians in the public service follow a more informal path up the salary and classification ladders, by being successful at being hired through competitions for higher classifications that may be far more subjective than military promotion boards. In future missions, it would be advantageous for civilian departments to consider identifying and preparing civilians with the experience and appropriate personal qualities for service in conflict areas at the equivalent rank levels of major and lieutenant-colonel (EX minus 1 and 2, EX-01) and assign them to similar staff positions in an integrated brigade headquarters. The authors recommend that civilians be made full-fledged staff officers with comparable rank and appointments to their military counterparts (as opposed to the "advisor" model) as this would be a positive step in addressing some of the inherent cultural discomfort experienced by the military associated with inserting civilians into a brigade headquarters.

While there is no need to have equality in expectations between the military and civilians from each department, it should be recognised that inequalities will likely cause friction. Military are ordered to go to failed states, whereas civilians volunteer for this work and were not originally recruited into the Canadian public service with the predispositions or skills to work in conflict environments. The authors observed that the soldiers are trained for years to work in an environment such as Kandahar and are more aware of the personal inconveniences and dangers that exist, whereas civilians have typically only received basic awareness training for service overseas in conflict areas. Further, by the nature of the military professional development system, officers have to achieve a number of career and training milestones in both combat and staff training in order to be promoted. Yet, few officers at the ranks of captain and major (the likely interface ranks with civilians) have had the opportunity to work or train with civilians, for example, by being attached to CIDA or DFAIT. Military officers are more likely to have had experience with civilians in peacekeeping or relief missions, which can sometimes lead to negative perceptions of the operational capabilities of civilians. These interactions with the UN or NGOs abroad cannot compare with the Government of Canada's civilian department staff procedures. Therefore, learning opportunities should be encouraged in order to bridge cultural differences and foster a "team Canada" civilian-military spirit in future deployments.

Due to the fact that civilians volunteer for their position, an effort had been made to be more accommodating to them in Kandahar and Kabul so that they would volunteer in sufficient numbers. These benefits include improved living conditions and more generous allowances, although these benefits also differed between civilian organisations. While the specifics of each group's benefits may vary, or may not always be perceived accurately by others, the friction created by perceived inequality should be acknowledged and preferably mitigated, as all personnel are deployed to the same location and experience the same environment. It was observed by the authors that one way of fostering good relationships was to socialise as a group after work, which can be facilitated with communal patios and social events.

7.0   DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are many different ways in which cooperation between all the members of a deployed nation can work together more effectively. Cooperation can be improved through combined pre-deployment training and exercises, better alignment of rotations, and a more well-defined organisational structure, as these options are practical, achievable, and seem to have been successful based on the authors' experience and observation of their application in Kandahar.

It is important that everyone be given the opportunity to work and train together during the pre-deployment process. Where possible, therefore, exchanges between departments should be fostered. Training courses are a good environment in which to foster communication and collaboration, and may offer the advantage of being a requirement in which everyone must participate. Currently the courses are typically taught by one

department for the benefit of the other; for example, a cultural awareness course is offered by DFAIT (the Centre for Intercultural Learning) with participants from DND, and the Introduction to OPP & COIN course is offered by DND with participants from DFAIT, CIDA, and other civilian departments. While this approach does work well, in the authors' view it could be enhanced if each time a course was offered, students from multiple departments were able to attend. The ability to interact with their future colleagues would allow for the building of trust and information-sharing in an environment of learning, where individuals can learn of their future colleagues' strengths and areas of expertise. The Introduction to OPP & COIN course demonstrated how the OPP process (shown below in Figure 3) can benefit from input by civilians in a non-planning role (their potential involvement is highlighted in red). The civilians who are part of the J5 Integrated Planning Team may potentially contribute to the whole process.

Step 1 Initiation	Step 2 Orientation	Step 3 Course of Action Development	Step 4 Plan Development	Step 5 Plan Review
Activities: ►*Receipt or assumption of mission or task(s)* ► *Gather information* ► Scope out the problem ► *Form the planning team*	Activities: ► *Mission Analysis* ► *Higher Commander's Intent, Mission, Concept of operations* ► *Assigned tasks* ► *Implied tasks* ► *Essential tasks* ► *Limitations: Constraints Restraints* ► *Changes to situation* ► *Points of clarification* ► *Assumptions – err on side of caution*	Activities: ► *Analysis* ► *Advisor Input* ► Develop courses of Action (Enemy COAs *And Friendly COAs*) ► *Conduct COA Comparison*	Activities: ► Refine Comd's Intent and Concept ► Resolve shortfalls ► Prepare the plan ► *Develop Contingency* and support plans ► *Wargame the COAs*	Activities: ► Conduct progress or periodic review ► Conduct exercise and/or wargames ► Plan evaluation to test against changing circumstances ► *Re-initiate OPP (if required)* ► Update and issue amendments as required

Figure 5 - 3: OGD contribution to the Operational Planning Process [9]

(Italics text indicates potential OGD involvement from non-planners)

The most prevalent area of collaboration in the pre-deployment environment is with the practical pre-deployment training (e.g., Exercise Unified Warrior, Exercise Unified Ready, and Exercise Maple Guardian). These exercises have offered the opportunity for DFAIT, CIDA, CSC, RCMP, and DND civilians and military to become familiar with each other, with the work that they will be performing, and with a variety of non-governmental organisations. These types of joint exercises should continue to recruit as many participants as possible.

An area of difficulty is the rotations schedules of all the different departments. The military changed all its headquarters personnel approximately every 9-10 months, and all the field personnel approximately every 6-7 months. The civilian departments have mostly 12-month terms that are occasionally shorter or longer, and unlike the military, there is no specific point in time where everyone rotates out; individuals arrive and depart at different times. The different rotation schedules between organisations can cause problems, as it is more difficult to do pre-deployment training together, and civilian personnel were not always able to attend the military-planned exercises as they had either been deployed already or the next individual had not yet been chosen. One option may be to identify civilian participants, or likely civilian candidates, early enough in the process to ensure that they can attend pre-deployment training and exercises with their military counterparts.

One method to better integrate civilians and military would be to establish an organisational chart with some defined collaborative roles. An operational environment does require some flexibility, so the chart should not be rigid, but some aspects of it should be established sufficiently well that a reliance on personality, or personality conflicts, does not cause major and irreparable changes to cooperation. Examples of these roles that were successfully implemented in the authors' view include the White SA Team and the J5 Integrated Planning Team (the latter had development, governance, and civilian police planners for 1.5 years, and this organisation existed for three military headquarters rotations). Misconceptions of roles and responsibilities might be mitigated by instituting policy outlining the expected reporting structures and collaborative relationships, and briefing these during pre-deployment training.

8.0 CONCLUSION

There is a clear requirement to have an effective working relationship between all departments within a nation and the individuals who work for them. This is achieved with time, enthusiasm, and effort from all involved. Effort should be focused on better formalising pre-deployment training and exercises, more effectively lining up the rotation schedules, and establishing a more well-defined organisational structure. Positive changes are necessary, as culturally based friction or conflict amongst organisations within a nation, let alone NATO, must be addressed before such organisations, military and civilian, can more effectively meet the challenges posed by the conflict in Afghanistan and other parts of the world.

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